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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Russia and the diffusion of political norms: the perfect
rival?
Tom Casier
Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Brussels, Belgium
ABSTRACT
Russian norm diffusion has been studied mainly as the mirror image of the EU’s, but
deserves to be studied in its own right and complexity. Three core categories of
political norms are explored: sovereign choice, regime and conservative ideas. It is
argued that Russia does not promote a coherent political model, by lack of one,
but rather diffuses a disparate set of conservative ideas and non-democratic
practices. Russia’s normative positioning is equivocal. It champions established
international norms like sovereignty, placing itself within the dominant normative
community, but contesting the application by the West. When it comes to certain
liberal political norms (often reduced to a strawman version), it questions their
validity and rejects them, placing itself outside the dominant normative
community, but claiming to defend “genuine” European values. This makes Russia
an ambiguous norm contester, rather than the perfect normative rival of the EU.
The complexity of its norm contestation follows from exogenous motives: it is
predominantly an anti-hegemonic reaction against what it perceives as the Western
imposition of norms, harming vital Russian interests.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 July 2020; Accepted 7 April 2021
KEYWORDS Russia; norms; norm contestation; norm diffusion; conservatism; liberalism
Introduction
The diffusion of norms1 byRussia has been both over-researched and under-researched.
It has been over-researched in the sense that a lot of literature is devoted to the norms the
Russian Federation is assumed to stand for: sovereign democracy, authoritarianism, illi-
beralism, conservatism, civilizational thinking. It has been under-researched in the
sense that there are very few systematic studies of the diffusion of these norms and
their effective adoption.With researchers getting increasingly interested in competition
over the neighbourhood, Russian norm diffusion received mounting attention, but was
studied mainly as the mirror image of EU norm diffusion.
As a result, many questions need to be answered in the study of Russia’s promotion
of political norms. What does Russia promote? How is this linked to its own domestic
system? Who are the bearers of these norms? How does Russia position itself vis-à-vis
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the EU or Euro-Atlantic normative community? How does it promote and diffuse
norms? What do they aim to achieve? What do they effectively achieve? It goes
without saying that these are far too many questions to answer here. This article
seeks to make a contribution primarily by exploring which political norms Russia
diffuses in its external relations and what this means for its supposed role of norm con-
tester. It thereby revisits the literature on Russian foreign policy and norms against the
background of theoretical literature on norm diffusion and contestation. Three rel-
evant categories of political norms are detected: the sovereign right to choose;
regime type; conservative ideas. The distinction between these three categories is
essential to understand Russia’s complex role as norm diffuser and contester.
The article is rooted in the claim thatRussiannormdiffusionneeds to studied in its own
right, in its specificity and complexity. This claim will be supported by different argu-
ments. First, it will be argued that Russia’s norm diffusion has too often been approached
as the simplemirror image of the EU’s orWestern normdiffusion, inparticular in thefield
of regime promotion. Second, a congruence between Russia’s domestic model and the
norms it promotes cannot be a priori assumed. Third, Moscow does not offer a coherent,
systematic alternative, but its normdiffusion is characterizedbyapatchworkof ideological
and particularistic ideas and driven by state and non-state actors. Finally, it will be argued
that to understandRussian normpromotion and diffusion, it is key to understand its anti-
hegemonic positioning vis-à-vis what Russian leaders called a liberal “elite club”.
In order to make the points mentioned, this article will first develop the idea of
norm contestation and roles theoretically. After that it will answer the question
which political norms Moscow diffuses. The subsequent section makes some tentative
statements about the instruments of Russian norm diffusion. All this paves the way for
a balanced attempt to situate Russia on the spectrum of norm dynamics roles, distin-
guished in the theoretical section. Finally, the article concluded with reflections on the
anti-hegemonic motives behind Russia’s promotion of political norms.
Norm contestation: a theoretical note
Beyond contestation as mirror image
The days of the EU’s regional “normative hegemony”2 have passed. In particular in the
1990s, in the aftermath of the collapse of communism and with a long waiting list of
applicant countries, the EU was regarded by many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe as the model to follow. The norms it promoted rested on broad consent and
even an appearance of universality. Its leading role appeared as natural and uncon-
tested. This changed when some countries, Russia in particular, started questioning
this leadership, rejecting the right of the EU to impose its norms on others. This
became particularly clear with the launching of the term “sovereign democracy”,
emphasizing Russia’s right to choose its own path to democracy. With the declining
willingness, inside and outside Europe, to take the EU’s norms for granted, the interest
of researchers in norm contestation grew.
As the interest came in the first place from researchers who had been studying EU
norm diffusion, research on norm contestation was often undertaken from an EU-
centric perspective. Many authors approached the norms Moscow rejects or defends
with the EU or “the West” as point of reference and as a reaction against them.
Russian norm promotion then regularly appears as the mirror image of Western
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norm diffusion.3 Since the EU promotes democracy, Russia is seen as diffusing author-
itarianism. Since the EU exports its own political “model”, Russia is assumed to do the
same. Yet, this approach raises some issues. First of all, authoritarianism is a very broad
concept. If it is the antonym of (liberal) democracy, it stands for a wide range of very
different regime types and varied instruments of suppressing rights and liberties.4
When it is suggested that Moscow is exporting authoritarianism, it at least needs to
be explained which norms exactly it is diffusing. Secondly, various authors have
assumed that Russia is simply exporting its own (authoritarian) political model.5
The mere assumption of congruence between the domestic political model and the
norms exported is again transplanted from the study of EU norm diffusion. It
reflects the idea behind the influential Normative Power Europe concept of Ian
Manners, whereby the EU’s political form (and normative nature) “predisposes it to
act in a normative way” in international relations.6 In the case of Russia, this is not
per definition the case. Most fundamentally, the question can be raised whether
Russia has a clear political model of its own. It has been labelled in the most diverse
ways, for example as managed democracy, competitive authoritarian system,7 dual
state,8 heterarchy,9 neo-patrimonial system10 or even simply reduced to sui generis
“Putinism”.11 Pavlovsky argues that
despite his image as an all-powerful tsar, Putin has never managed to build a bureaucratically
successful authoritarian state. Instead, he has merely crafted his own version of sistema, a
complex practice of decision-making and power management that has long defined Russian
politics and society and that will outlast Putin himself.12
He argues that the “governance style relies on indirection and interpretation rather
than command and control”.13 These types of conceptualizations raise serious
doubts on whether Russia has a specific model, let alone one that is exportable. Any
research thus needs to clarify which norms Russia seeks to diffuse and study these
norms in their own right.
Norm contestation
To grasp Russia’s norm diffusion and contestation,14 we need to understand what
forms norm contestation can take and what roles can be distinguished when it
comes to defending or contesting norms.15 The focus is hereby specifically on contesta-
tion by state representatives, in this case of Russia, challenging “robust” norms in their
foreign policy discourse.16 Deitelhoff and Zimmermann speak of “norm robustness”
when a norm is widely accepted and when it guides actions.17
From the norms dynamic literature, we retain two useful distinctions between types
of norm contestation. First, the contestation of norms within a normative community
needs to be distinguished from contestation between normative communities.18 The
latter are often characterized by asymmetrical relations, whereby the more powerful
community seeks to diffuse its norms to other communities. Second, a distinction
can be made between “applicatory” contestation and contesting the “validity” of a
norm.19 Applicatory contestation refers to contesting when and how to apply a
norm. As it does not contest the norm itself, it usually strengthens the norm. Validity
contestation questions the righteousness of the norm itself. As a result, it challenges the
core of the norm and tends to weaken its robustness. As discussed below, today Russia
undoubtedly positions itself in a different normative community when it rejects certain
political liberal norms, while interestingly it often does so on the basis of the claim that
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it defends “genuine” European norms (understood as a selected set of conservative
norms). In other cases, concerning norms of public international law, it mainly ques-
tions the application of norms by the West.
Related to this, distinctions can be made between types of actors, according to their
different intentions towards the dominant norms. Are the norm contesters simply
resisting norms or are they actively presenting an alternative set of norms, thus per-
forming the role of “rival entrepreneur”20? Bloomfield presents a norm dynamics
role spectrum, revealing different attitudes vis-à-vis status quo norms: “Pure norm
entrepreneurs” and “competitor entrepreneurs” intend to challenge the status quo
norms.21 They belong to a different normative community but disagree among them-
selves on the scope and content of the new norms. On the other side of the spectrum,
“pure norm antipreneurs” and “creative resisters” are part of the same status quo nor-
mative community, intending to defend the status quo norms, but the latter accept
some degree of change. In the case of Russia, it can be argued that – at least in
some respects – it moved from “creative resister” within a Western normative commu-
nity (thus defending theWestern political norms, but seeking some adaptation of those
norms) to a role outside this community, explicitly rejecting these norms.22 Whether it
is a “competitor entrepreneur” or a “pure norm entrepreneur” needs to be established
further in this article and will require a nuanced answer.
Which norms?
Which political norms is Russia diffusing in its foreign policy? Three categories are dis-
tinguished in this article: norms related to the sovereign right of countries to make
their own choices; to regime type; and conservative ideas. It goes without saying
that these three categories are interconnected and partly overlap.
Before exploring these three categories, a few words need to be added about the
sources of norm diffusion and the channels through which they are communicated.
Inevitably the norms diffused result from a complex aggregation of views held by
various domestic elite groups. Since this article deals with norm diffusion across the
borders, the internal forces of Russian foreign policy matter most. Romanova dis-
tinguishes state institutions, parties, the business world, civil society and epistemic
communities.23 She underlines the relative coherence among these forces when it
comes to their view of the liberal order: “Attempts to present an alternative view
remain timid and are limited to the non-systemic opposition and a narrow part of
the epistemic community”.24 Moreover, norm promotion happens to a great extent
through streamlined official narratives (for example on “sovereign democracy” or
the West’s imposition of norms). These are voiced primarily by the two main
foreign policy actors: president Putin and minister of foreign affairs Lavrov. They
also feature in key documents, like the Foreign Policy Concept.25 It is this discourse
that leads the following analysis, while the subsequent section will reflect on channels
of norm diffusion. Where relevant, more specific sources of certain norms will be
indicated.
Sovereign right of choice
A first category of norms which are crucial to understand Russia’s role are those related
to sovereignty and non-interference. This approach fits within the influential “statist”
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foreign policy school in Russia. This tradition puts the emphasis on power, stability
and sovereignty as prerequisites for the state’s ability to govern.26 The most assertively
proclaimed norm today is the sovereign right of countries to make their own choices.27
There are ample references in the official discourse to the EU and the West imposing
their will. Putin spoke about the imposition of a “unilateral Diktat”.28 Foreign minister
Lavrov referred to the extension of the liberal world order “as an instrument for ensur-
ing the growth of an elite club of countries and its domination over everyone else”.29
Also the Foreign Policy Concepts state the goal of “respecting national and historic
peculiarities of each State in the process of democratic transformations without impos-
ing borrowed value systems on anyone”.30 Clearly, Moscow’s reading is that EU norm
diffusion serves the purpose of power and the creation of spheres of influence. It is in
the first place this element they have started to resist actively. The concept of “sover-
eign democracy” launched in 2005 illustrates this well. This term, introduced by
Surkov,31 was expressed in Putin’s State of the Union during that same year:
Russia is a country that has chosen democracy through the will of its own people. It chose this
road of its own accord and it will decide itself how best to ensure that the principles of freedom
and democracy are realised here, taking into account our historic, geopolitical and other par-
ticularities and respecting all fundamental democratic norms. As a sovereign nation, Russia can
and will decide for itself the timeframe and conditions for its progress along this road.32
Within Russia “the ideas underpinning the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ have
taken root in mainstream foreign policy narrative”.33 Formulations have changed
since its launch, but the idea of sovereign choice has been extended to different
domains, such as the economic and cultural spheres.34
Regime promotion
A second category consists of the norms related to regime promotion. Because of the
assumption that they form the mirror image of EU democracy promotion, this cat-
egory has received broad attention. There is disagreement about the question
whether Russia promotes a regime or not. Some authors have simply put Russia in
the role of an inhibitor of Western democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space.
Tolstrup, for example, argued that Russia is a “negative external actor” “because it
actively weakens the liberal performance of its neighbours”.35 In a similar way, Nati-
lizia sees Russia as a “black knight”, seeking to thwart democracy and to weaken demo-
cratic forces.36 Ambrosio referred to “authoritarian resistance” to regional democratic
trends, based on strategies of insulating (preventing foreign NGOs from opposing the
regime), bolstering (supporting authoritarianism) and subverting democratic trends.37
Yet, the question remains whether Russia weakens democratization efforts because it
opposes democracy and wants to promote an alternative regime or rather because it
is concerned about instability and seeks to weaken regimes unfriendly to Moscow.38
This would make loyalty the determining factor, rather than intrinsic concerns
about the regime type.
Many authors have argued that non-democratic powers are not per definition auto-
cracy supporters.39 In a general study, Bank argues that authoritarian diffusion is
mainly pragmatic and interest based, except when it is backed up by a missionary
ideology, as was the case for communist regimes.40 In the absence of that, the
diffusion of an authoritarian ideology tends to have limited appeal. Weyland reaches
a similar conclusion and speaks of “immunisation” against Western democracy
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promotion.41 When regime survival is at stake, non-democratic regimes will opt for
“targeted, calculated collaboration and instrumental learning” and seek to reinforce
their regional influence.42 For Russia specifically, Babayan argues that Russia is not
engaged in autocracy promotion because of a lack of ideological underpinning.43
Only when it considers strategic interests threatened, will it resort to military or econ-
omic threats and incentives “to make the compliance with Western policies less pre-
ferable”.44 Also Way finds little support for the thesis that Russia is making the
post-Soviet space less democratic. Moreover, he points at Moscow’s inconsistency in
support for autocracy.45 Evidence suggests that if Russia engages in regime promotion
or democratization inhibition, it does so in a differentiated way in the post-Soviet
space. It certainly has not resisted democratization over the entire line. In the case
of the “velvet revolution” and regime change in Armenia in 2018, for example,
Russia did not oppose democratization.
As mentioned above, Russia lacks a clear exportable political model. It can therefore
not be seen as promoting a particular regime type, but rather as diffusing disparate
ideas about governance and selectively legitimizing non-democratic practices.
Conservative ideas
If Russia does not have a coherent regime model to export, how about the diffusion of
conservative ideas? According to Chebankova, Russian conservatism presents a “dis-
tinct value package”, which may serve as an alternative for the West.46 Within
Russian conservatism she distinguishes between ideational and positionist perspec-
tives. The former is a reaction against globalization and post-modernity by a return
to values of modernity: family, patriotism, national bourgeoisie. The positionist per-
spective is similar to Western conservatism. It puts a central emphasis on strong state-
hood, multipolar international relations, and the plurality of cultures. It is strongly
tradition oriented. According to Chebankova this positionist perspective has the stron-
gest influence on Russian domestic and foreign policy.47 Yet, she refers to this as “a
position”, rather than an articulated society project. Therefore we cannot speak
about the diffusion of a coherent conservative ideology, but rather of diffuse conserva-
tive ideas.
Laruelle refers to the influence of the school of “young conservatives” (mladokon-
servatory), who have embraced an illiberal agenda. Some of their ideas on rebranding
Russia as an international conservative power, voiced among others by Boris Mezh-
uyev, have found their way into the Kremlin.48 For this school “illiberalism is no back-
ward-looking ideology but rather an engine of revolutionary dynamism, uniquely
capable of powering rebellion against the global liberal status quo”.49 According to
Morozov, “paleoconservatives” (starokonservatory) have replaced moderate conserva-
tives and have dominated the political landscape since 2012.50 They stand for an “expli-
cit rejection of modernity as detrimental to tradition and organic spirituality”.51 In
contrast to their moderate predecessors, who complained about unequal treatment
by the EU, “today’s paleoconservatives have embraced the image of Russia as a tradi-
tionalist sovereign power and, in that sense, the opposite of Europe with its moral
decadence and helplessness in the face of repeated crises”.52 Russia is presented as
the defender of the genuine values of Europe. This fits within the idea of a binary
between “true” and “false Europe”, whereby Russia stands for true Europe and
Western Europe represents the false, Americanized Europe.53 It fits within the
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broader civilizational thinking, often drawing on the heritage of Vadim Tsymbursky,
which has strong appeal in Russian debates and resonates with some Huntingtonian
ideas.54 This thinking rejects the universalism of Western values.
An issue of confusion is who the bearers and diffusers of conservative ideas are. Lit-
erature in this field often refers to both intellectuals and politicians. But it is unclear
whether these intellectuals influence certain elite circles or the entire state apparatus.
A classic example is that of Aleksandr Dugin, who appears in a lot of literature on
Russian conservatism,55 but was at some point erroneously presented as Putin’s
advisor or inspirer. When it comes to their translation into the official political
agenda, the conservative ideas are often formulated in vague terms only, with vague
references to family, fatherland or spirituality. Foreign Minister Lavrov, for example,
stated that “human solidarity must have a moral basis formed by traditional values
that are largely shared by the world’s leading religions”.56
Robinson sees official conservatism as one strand of conservatism, putting the
emphasis on traditional values, borrowing elements from Orthodox and civilizational
conservatism, but overall more moderate and pragmatic.57 Also according to Laruelle,
the Putin regime still represents “a moderate, centrist conservatism”, but faces chal-
lenges either “to ally with or marginalize more radical voices.”58 Russian conservatism
has a long tradition and was “co-opted” by the Russian regime, that engaged into an
“étatization of preexisting illiberal beliefs and attitudes. In embracing these beliefs,
the state has been not so much carrying out a deliberate strategy as adjusting to a
reality that has grown less and less favorable to the ruling elites”.59 Morozov, on the
other hand, speaks of “Putinite paleoconservatism”, celebrating difference and
mutual exclusion between Russia and the West.60 Putin has referred to Western
post-modern values being out of step with the conservative views of the Russian
“moral majority”, in particular when it comes to “stable identities” such as gender,
family or nation.61 Paleoconservative ideas are closely linked to ideas of an “illiberal”
democracy, a regime where electoral competition is preserved, but no longer goes hand
in hand with rights and liberties, which are seen as essential conditions in the concept
of liberal democracy.
Yet, it is important not to see the conservatism of Russian authorities in a mono-
lithic way. Laruelle distinguishes between three continuously evolving “ideological
ecosystems” in the Putin regime: the presidential administration, the military-indus-
trial complex and the Orthodox realm.62 The latter two stand for the most consistent
conservative agenda, while the presidential administration mainly uses conservative
ideas for instrumental reasons. Along the same lines, several authors have emphasized
the instrumental use of Orthodox and civilizational discourses by the regime.63 Others,
such as Gudkov, have referred to the pseudo character of the regime’s “imitation tra-
ditionalism”.64 Again, we are confronted here with disparate ideas rather than a coher-
ent state ideology. The next section will reflect on how these norms are diffused.
Paths of norm diffusion
When the EU diffuses norms, it does so to a large extent in an explicit and transparent
way. The norms and rules to be adopted are listed in public documents (Accession
Partnerships, Action Plans, Association Agendas, etc.). Conditionality determines
the primary dynamics. In the case of Russia, norm diffusion is much harder to
study. Not only is there less openness about the specifics of its norm promotion
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towards certain countries, but the policy is also less systematic. It is a “patchwork of
different policy practices”65 and follows both official and non-official channels. This
implies that Russia’s paths of norm diffusion are harder to study. Only a limited
number of systematic case studies on specific countries is available.66 Moreover, one
of the major analytical challenges is to distinguish which norms in post-Soviet states
result from the active diffusion of political norms by Russia and which ones can be
attributed to the shared legacy of the Soviet system and the post-communist transition,
as Samokhvalov and Rabinovych point out in their contribution to this special issue.67
Despite this lack of systematic empirical research, what can be said tentatively? It
goes beyond the scope of this article to give an overview of Russia’s coercive practices
in diffusing norms. Makarychev argues that Russia engages in “constructing enemies”
rather than making friends, selectively resorting to coercive practices.68 This was the
case, for example, with the restrictive trade practices that Russia applied to the
Eastern Partnership states to dissuade them from signing an Association Agreement
with the EU. Let us have a more detailed look at how Russia seeks to shape domestic
politics through non-coercive means. Noutcheva mentions four soft mechanisms of
external influence: persuasion of domestic actors, legitimization of domestic policies
or practices, legitimization of domestic actors, diffusion of ideas.69
The idea that Russia diffuses conservative norms through “the power of examples”70
is confirmed by Makarychev, who claims that Russia seeks to increase its attraction on
third actors not so much through active promotion, but simply by going back to its
historical roots and by distinguishing conservative Russia from liberal and multi-cul-
tural Europe.71 This allows Russia to profile itself and to create channels of communi-
cation with conservative forces elsewhere. It also allows Russia to promote certain
narratives and to diffuse its interpretation of events. Undeniably, Russia’s conservative
profiling has had appeal in certain conservative circles, including in the West.72 There
is, however, no systematic evaluation at hand assessing the emulation of Russian con-
servative ideas beyond specific parties or politicians. Moreover, the impact of the
myriad of conservative norms across Russia’s borders is particularly challenging to
analyse. Despite clear similarities with European and American conservative narra-
tives, it is difficult to separate whether the latter result from Russian influence,
develop in parallel or result from a common foundation.73 Russian conservatism has
moved away from its position of Russia’s Sonderweg into a degree of “Europeaniza-
tion”, whereby it sees itself more connected to the conservatism in the West.74 Due
to this greater confluence with conservative attitudes on the rise in the West, Russia
takes advantage of these new voices, consorts with them, and often tries to amplify them, but it
did not originate this homegrown dynamic and has no realistic influence over it. Russia acts not
as a societal transformer, but as an echo chamber of European and American societies’ own
doubts and transformations.75
Reflecting the nature of the Russian sistema,76 the legitimization of domestic actors
seems to be connected more strongly to personal and business links than it is to norms.
Yet, when it comes to the legitimization of domestic practices, the credo of civiliza-
tional pluralism and the rejection of the universality of Western norms can act as a
powerful legitimizer for non-democratic regimes. The same holds for the idea of sover-
eign democracy, whereby the idea of sovereign choice, without foreign intervention,
clearly becomes the most important denominator. This may delegitimize Western
democracy promotion77 or simply provide a useful pretext for undemocratic practices.
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Finally, Russia may use formal or informal institutions as vehicles of influence and
persuasion. Laruelle attributes an important role to the Orthodox Church seeking to
position itself “as the leader of a new ‘moralist international’”.78 The Russian Orthodox
Church is used instrumentally to target parts of the population in countries like
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, adding mainly to the conservative agenda Russia pro-
motes.79 Similar stories can be told about media, such as Russia Today, targeting
certain audiences abroad and playing a key role in distributing a Russian narrative.
Yet, this narrative often serves more the purpose of thwarting certain “Western”
interpretations of events than actively diffusing norms. Equally important is how the
concept of “Russian world” (russkiy mir), expressing the idea of a Russia bigger than
the actual territory of the Russian Federation, has served as a vehicle to instrumentalize
the Russian speaking diaspora.80
To conclude on a side note, it goes beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the
effectiveness of Russian norm diffusion, apart from stating that there is a need for a
proliferated set of case studies, looking at specific sectors, instruments and target
groups of norm diffusion. To date there is little evidence of coherent and sustained
diffusion of political norms. Convergence may occur in specific cases, such as restric-
tive legislation on NGOs. Armenia, for example, emulated the Russian legislative
model on this front.81 Referring to Georgia and Ukraine, Delcour and Wolczuk
have argued that, even when Russia seeks to act as “a spoiler” of Western democratiza-
tion in post-Soviet states, this may often have counter-productive effects and reinforce
democracy support.82 It is broadly recognized that the role of domestic actors and the
domestic configuration of forces is of crucial importance in determining the effective-
ness of Russia’s norm diffusion.83
Situating Russia as norm contester
Where then do we situate Russia as norm diffuser and norm contester? Is it the perfect
normative rival of the EU (or by extension the Euro-Atlantic community)? The div-
ision between Western norm defenders on one side and Russia as challenger on the
other side is certainly not that linear. The reality is more complex and ambivalent:
both sides claim to be the true defenders of some key international norms. This is
the case for norms such as sovereignty and non-interference, but also for multilateral-
ism – despite multiple violations. Russia also stands up for some of the core norms of
Europe’s post-ColdWar arrangements. It has profiled itself as the defender of the prin-
ciple of indivisibility of security, laid down in the 1990 “Charter of Paris for a new
Europe”.84 This norm was at the heart of the draft European Security Treaty, proposed
in 2009 by then President Medvedev.85 Despite Moscow’s critique of the West impos-
ing its norms on others, it presents itself in this field as the defender of the agreed
norms and positions itself within the status quo normative community. When it
comes to political liberal norms, however, the story is different. Liberal norms are fre-
quently dismissed as a pretext for maintaining Western dominance. Ambassador Sol-
tanovsky, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe, stated for
example: “The protection of human rights is no longer perceived as a supreme value
and the basis of this organization, but only as a populist tool to combat geopolitical
rivals”.86 He added that the scandalous “politicization of human rights” has taken “a
systemic character”. Instead, Russia presents itself as defender of “genuine” European
norms, de facto a disparate set of illiberal norms. In sum, the representation of Russia
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as a full-fledged norm contester or challenger of the status quo is at least a simplifica-
tion, predominantly following from an overemphasis on political liberal norms.
Rephrasing the above, where does this place Russia on Bloomfield’s norm dynamics
role spectrum? When it comes to political liberal norms, Russia has moved away from
the “Western” normative community and today positions itself firmly in a different
normative community than the West, assertively challenging the norms of the latter.
It is hard to classify the country within this spectrum of roles. As Russia openly chal-
lenges the status quo and the universality of Western norms, it appears minimally as a
“competitor entrepreneur” and in some case as a rivalling “pure norm entrepreneur”,
radically rejecting Western “post-modern” norms. On the other hand, it presents itself
as the defender of “authentic” European norms and makes active use of “Western”
norms like sovereignty and of conservatism to challenge the norms of “the West”.
This would also allow to define Russia as a “creative resister”.
The reason for this conundrum may be that Russia discursively produced its own
image of Western status quo norms and created to some degree a strawman. It is
fighting a rival that does not really exist in these terms, but consists of the image
Moscow itself has created: a unified post-modern, ultraliberal West, that has rejected
any form of tradition. It thus ignores the diversity of opinions and policies that exist
within the West. The most clear example is probably the widely disseminated
concept of “Gayropa”, whereby the EU’s status quo norms get discursively almost
reduced to the imposition of LGBT rights and same sex marriage on an “unwilling
majority”.
A further complication follows from the debate whether Russia is genuine when it
invokes established norms of the international community or whether it contests
norms through a “parody” of certain “Western” normative discourses. According to
Burai, Russia’s normative discourse systematically refers to and reproduces the
Western discourse, in particular on norms “where standards of behaviour are pro-
foundly contested”.87 For example, Russia invoked principles of self-determination
and the “Kosovo precedent” to justify the annexation of Crimea. Also the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (R2P) has been invoked to justify military intervention. Burai argues that
the “parodic appropriation of normative language has a destabilizing normative
impact”, exposing theWestern normative discourse by problematizing the “contingent
nature of normative contextualisation”.88 In this sense the selective and parodic imita-
tion of Western or EU normative discourse can be seen as a form of norm contestation.
It has the capacity to decentre European identity by challenging “the EU’s power to
define the normative meaning of Europe”,89 by confronting it with the inconsistent
and biased application of its own norms, whether it is R2P, self-determination or
human rights.90 Inevitably this weakens the validity of the norm. A similar idea is
reflected in Bettiza and Lewis’s concept of “liberal mimicry”: “a type of meaning con-
testation, which consists in adopting the form of liberal discourses and practices, while
simultaneously giving these a non-liberal content”,91 with the goal of redefining the
meaning of liberal norms. Kurowska and Reshetnikov refer to Russia’s “trickster prac-
tice of ‘overidentification’ with norms, which apparently endorses but indirectly sub-
verts the normative frameworks within which it is performed.”92
Self-evidently, the argument of parody as contestation can be analytically challen-
ging. While offering a revealing perspective, it may be problematic when it is simply
assumed that Russia’s imitation of norms is driven by the consistent intention to
mock them, while the same question is not asked about other actors referring to
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similar norms. Also, Western actors have amply abused international norms for their
own strategic purposes, ultimately rendering it difficult to determine where exactly to
situate the dividing line between rhetorical abuse of norms and outright parody.
Russia’s motives behind norm diffusion
To understand Russia’s equivocal norm diffusion, it is crucial to distinguish between
endogenous and exogenous motives.93 Endogenous motives are typical of autocratic
regimes, who are driven by internal motives to spread their ideology over the world.
As argued above, Russia lacks such a coherent ideology, despite the support of some
elites for a diffuse conservative agenda. Its main motive is exogenous. It is a reaction
against what it perceives to be the Western imposition of norms, harming vital Russian
strategic interests.94 In other words, its norm diffusion is driven more by strategic and
pragmatic instrumental reasons than by ideological conviction. It is a resistance against
what Putin and Lavrov labelled a Western “Diktat” and the Euro-Atlantic community
abusing the extension of liberal world order to maintain domination. This anti-hege-
monic positioning is the backbone of Russian foreign policy today. There is consensus
among many authors that the latter is driven by its ambition to regain great power
status and to maintain regional influence.95 Tatiana Romanova speaks of a “neorevi-
sionist challenge”, explaining
why Russia has consistently exploited the in-built contradictions of the liberal international
order. It is Russia’s dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War settlement, and in particular
Moscow’s belief that it does not have the place it deserves in today’s global order.96
Laruelle adds:
Illiberalism thus offers a way for a postliberal Russia not only to establish a new normalcy at
home, but also to reject the low status of rule-taker (or even a spoiler or rogue state) that
the liberal world order has allocated to it.97
Krickovic argues along similar lines, stating that “Russia’s leaders see the current
international order as fundamentally unjust and detrimental to their country’s inter-
ests, but also profoundly destabilizing”.98 From the perspective of Social Identity
Theory, this is an understandable reaction. If an actor is frustrated about its status
within the dominant normative framework, it will try to alter the status markers, i.e.
the norms against which its behaviour and leadership are measured.99 Where these
norms withhold status (as is the case of political liberal norms), it is imperative to
weaken them. Where these norms protect you from interference by leading forces in
this hegemonic order (as is the case of sovereignty or non-interference), it is crucial
to defend them – even if this done selectively in practice. Krickovic calls Russia a “des-
perate challenger” of the hegemonic order.100 It is a power in relative decline, hoping to
reverse this decline by changing the international order. In light of this international
order that constrains Russia and limits its capacity to rise, the rejection of liberal
norms and promotion of illiberal norms get a different meaning. Rather than being
driven by intrinsic motivations, they are part of “a power political fragmenting strategy
designed to undermine the legitimacy, stability, and interpretation – and therefore the
influence – of liberal norms and their entrepreneurs.”101 They serve the purpose of
breaking “the West’s monopoly over the application and meaning of liberal principles
in world politics” and “articulating alternative non-liberal identities and normative
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frameworks,” which may mobilize support.102 Therefore, according to Makarychev,
also the
projection of [a] Russian conservative agenda outside of national borders has to be understood
as the key element of subverting [the] EU liberal project as intrusive and disrespectful to
national sovereignties (“democracy promotion” and “regime change”) and fostering radicaliza-
tion in affected countries (instead of “democratic peace”)… .103
Conclusion
This article argued that Russia’s norm diffusion cannot simply be approached as the
mirror image of the norms upheld by the EU or the West. A distinction was made
between different relevant categories of political norms which Russia promotes or
diffuses: sovereign choice, regime and conservative ideas. The right of sovereign
choice, without Western interference, has resonated strongly in several post-Soviet
states. However, Russia cannot be said to promote a specific (authoritarian) regime,
by lack of a clear political model or coherent ideology of its own. Yet, it may be
seen as a promotor of a disparate set of conservative ideas and non-democratic prac-
tices. Russian norm diffusion is not a very coherent policy, but a patchwork of different
practices, often operating through the power of example or informal links, rather than
systematic policy instruments.
Russia may be a norm contester, but it is a complex and ambiguous one, rather than
the EU’s perfect normative rival. It champions certain norms of public international
law, such as sovereignty, positioning itself within the dominant normative community,
but contesting the application of those norms by the West. When it comes to liberal, in
particular “post-modern,” norms of the West, it takes a radically different normative
position, challenging those norms vocally, albeit often in the form of a strawman.
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